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Abstract
We study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. As-
suming that the mafia is able to bring votes to the supported party in ex-
change of money, we show that (i) the strongest party is willing to pay the
highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with
the mafia increases with political competition and with the efficiency of the
mafia.
Studying in detail parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946-
1992, we document the significant support given by the Sicilian Mafia to
the Christian Democratic party, starting at least from the 1970s. This is
consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political competition became
much tighter during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced an exten-
sive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased
substantially its control of the territory. We also provide evidence that in
exchange for its electoral support the mafia got economic advantages for its
activities in the construction industry.
Keywords: electoral competition, mafia, Cosa Nostra, electoral fraud
JEL Classification: D72, K42, H42
∗Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK and Dipartimento di
Scienze Economiche e Aziendali, Università di Pavia. E-mail: giuseppe.defeo@strath.ac.uk.
†University of York, UK and LICOS, KU Leuven, Belgium. E-mail: gia-
como.deluca@york.ac.uk
1
Politics and mafia are both powers which draw life from the control of the
same territory; so they either wage war or come to some form of agreement.
Paolo Borsellino1
1 Introduction
Organized crime is detrimental to the functioning of a society. Its negative impact on
growth and economic activity is established in several recent studies (Dixit, 2004; Pinotti,
2012; Daniele and Marani, 2011; Albanese and Marinelli, 2013). The negative impact of
organized crime is however not confined to the economy. One of the main features of
mafias around the world is their relationship with the political power. The strong control
of the territory achieved through the use of violence also challenges the functioning of
democratic political institutions. For instance, criminal organization can directly influence
policymakers with bribes and violent threats to obtain policies favorable to their business
or looser judicial prosecution. This has been the case in Colombia during the Medellin
cartel and it is arguably occurring currently in Mexico and Brazil (Dal Bó et al., 2006).
The relationship between Mafia and democracy is paradoxical because on one side its
presence weakens the democratic institutions but on the other side it exploits the spaces of
democratic freedoms to strengthen its presence and weave the web of relationships with
the political power (Allum and Siebert, 2003). The development of mafia in transition
economies exemplifies this nexus: organized crime exploits the spaces opened by the
lift of totalitarian control on political institutions as well as the inability of the transition
countries to have strong institutions and rule of the law (Varese, 2001).
This paper addresses a far-reaching impact of organized crime: its intrusion into the
electoral process, the very heart of democratic institutions. In his seminal work on or-
ganized crime, Gambetta (1993) points out how well-rooted criminal organizations using
violence to control the territory find themselves in an ideal position to sell its services to
politicians. Indeed, the tight hold of the territory enables an effective control on a con-
sistent package of votes. In the words of Abadinsky (2012, p.116), “the mafia is able
to control votes because in the environment in which it operates there is always fear of
1Judge Paolo Borsellino has been on the frontline in the fight against mafia in 1980s. He was
killed in a car bomb attack in Palermo on 19 July 1992, few months after his colleague Judge G.
Falcone. This quote is taken from Abbate and Gomez (2007, p.36).
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reprisals. Intimidations, surveillance of polling places, and sometimes rigged elections
guarantee an outcome favourable to Mafia”.
Beyond the rhetoric adopted by politicians, when elections approach there is a strong
incentive for parties to negotiate with organized crime to secure its electoral support. A
conversation between the President of the parliamentary commission on mafia and the for-
mer mafioso Leonardo Messina well exemplifies the behavior of politicians with respect
to organized crime (Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e
sulle associazioni criminali similari, 1992, p.552):
Mr. Messina. Usually, in public speeches, every politician claims to be
against the mafia; you need to see what he actually does and the part he has
to play. In Sicily, anyone who gets on the stage is against the mafia.
President. As for the last point, is this something that worries you?
Mr. Messina. No, it doesn’t. The whole thing is a farce!
There is a large body of anecdotal evidence, court cases, political investigations and
press inquiries about the alleged existence of such underground electoral deals. Existing
material, however, falls short of empirical investigation, as well as of a theoretical model
explaining this relationship.
This leads to the contribution of this study. We examine the impact of organized crime
on both electoral competition and electoral outcomes. Our contribution is both theoretical
and empirical. First, to the best of our knowledge this is the first study formally analyzing
parties’ electoral competition in the presence of organized crime. Secondly, guided by
our theoretical framework, we study in detail post-WWII (1946 - 1992) national elections
in Sicily, and document the support to the Christian Democratic party provided by one of
the most notorious criminal organization, the Sicilian mafia.
On the theory side, we highlight several interesting aspects of electoral competition
in the presence of organized crime. First, we show that the infiltration of organized crime
in elections negatively affects the welfare of voters and of all parties. Indeed, all parties
would prefer fair electoral competition. The very presence of organized crime, however,
creates a trap: parties are induced to compete for securing the backing of it by the fear
of losing its consistent share of votes to their competitors. Second, the party gaining the
support of organized crime increases its vote share, thereby manipulating the electoral
outcome. Third, the electoral services of organized crime become more substantial (i)
when its control is more effective, and (ii) when electoral competition increases. Finally,
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we show that the electoral services provided by criminal organizations are more likely to
be adopted by the strongest political party.
Moving to our empirical analysis, we provide evidence of an electoral support of
the mafia to the Christian Democratic party (DC), the strongest party in post-war Italy:
DC systematically captured more votes in Sicilian municipalities in which the mafia was
operating. Interestingly, and in line with our theory, the evidence of the electoral deal
with the mafia emerges in the 1970s, when electoral competition in Italy became stronger
and the mafia assumed a more centralized structure, which reinforced the cartel of mafia
families, reduced the conflicts between and inside families, and made the grasp of territory
more efficient.
The magnitude of the impact is far from negligible: the Christian Democratic party
gained between 3 and 8 percentage points on average in mafia-ridden municipalities after
1970 only.
As for the return of its electoral services, we provide evidence that in exchange for its
support the mafia got economic advantages for its activities in the construction industry.
We show in fact that the share of workers in the construction sector was significantly
larger in mafia ridden municipalities than in the rest of Sicily.
This paper speaks to three broad strands of research. First, it contributes to the theoret-
ical literature on electoral competition in the presence of special interests groups. The vast
majority of this literature considers politicians as auctioneers receiving bribes proposals
from different interest groups, and influencing policies according to the preferences of the
highest bidder (e.g., Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 2001; Groseclose and
Snyder, 1996). Hence, politicians extract the maximal rent from special interests groups.
With respect to this literature, we show that when elections take place in the presence of
organized crime the roles are reversed: it is the criminal organization, notably a set of
individuals living outside the law and inflicting costs to the society, which can extract the
maximal rent from politicians in exchange for votes. In fact organized crime acts as a mo-
nopolist on its territory and competition occurs between buyers, i.e. the political parties,
of its services.
Second, we contribute to the literature on electoral fraud and vote coercion. The
literature on electoral fraud has been recently reviewed by Lehoucq (2003). We shed
new light on a specific sort of electoral fraud, relatively neglected so far: vote coercion
by criminal organizations. Two recent papers addressing vote coercion are close to ours
along several aspects. First, Baland and Robinson (2008) show how landlords were able
to influence electoral outcomes by inducing their tenants to vote for one of the parties. In
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their model, since landlords could monitor the voting behavior of their workers, parties
bought preferably those “controllable” voters. In the same vein, in our model parties buy
votes from the criminal organization as it controls votes. The second paper by (Acemoglu
et al., 2013) explores the impact of the presence of non-state armed groups on electoral
outcomes in Colombia, and shows that paramilitaries were delivering votes to candidates
whose preferences are close to theirs. In this paper, we show that a analogous electoral
deal can subsist even with a openly criminal organization, as the Sicilian mafia, and that
a similar logic also applies to a mature democracy in which blatant electoral frauds are
more difficult to implement.
Finally, this work extends the recent literature on the economics of organized crime.
Beside the studies assessing the cost of organized crime mentioned above, the economic
literature has investigated mainly its origins. Dixit (2004) investigated the emergence
of extralegal arrangements and organizations in the absence of formal institutions (or
when they are weak) and laws are difficult to enforce. Coordination problems arising
in a lawless society from the possibility of cheating on agreements can be potentially al-
leviated either internally or with the emergence of a third party which is able to enforce
the agreements and to reduce cheating behavior. Sometimes this role is taken by crimi-
nal organizations which use violence as their main feature (Gambetta, 1993; Franchetti,
1877). Other recent studies identifies peculiar conditions which favored the emergence
of Sicilian mafia: land fragmentation (Bandiera, 2003), high land productivity and sulfur
production (Del Monte and Pennacchio, 2012; Buonanno et al., 2012), and citrus produc-
tion (Dimico et al., 2012) have all been identified as features which increased the demand
for the private protection offered by the mafia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present our the-
oretical framework, then we provide the necessary background on Italian political com-
petition and the Sicilian mafia, followed by the description of the data and the empirical
results.
2 Theoretical Framework
We first set up a simple model of electoral competition. After solving the benchmark
model, we study the change in our results in the presence of a mafia organization. A
political system features two parties (party A and party B) who compete in a campaign
game to win the support of the electorate under a proportional system. Parties compete on
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the political arena to win the elections, characterized by proportional rule. The probability
for the party to form the government is given by the share of votes gained in the elections
(Austen-Smith, 2000; Baron and Diermeier, 2001). The electorate is divided into three
groups: the supporters of party A, yA, the supporters of party B, yB and the swing voters
(1− yA − yB) who are characterized by heterogeneous political preferences assumed to
be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The two political parties (or coalitions) are
assumed to be located at the extremes of the Hotelling line; party A at zero and party B
at 1. The supporters of party i = A,B gain utility r from voting their own party, while
a voter located at x belonging to the rest of the population gains a utility of r − x when
voting for party A and r − (1− x) when voting for party B.2
2.1 Campaign competition between parties
Parties compete in binding promises about the provision of some public good in order
to gain support among voters. Identifying with G the rent of being in office, the parties
compete in promises to use a certain amount of these resources, pi (with i = A,B), for
public good provision.
So the expected rent of participating in the campaign competition is given by the
residual rent parties gain if they form the government times the probability of forming the
government, that is by the share of votes obtained. The latter is given by the sum of the
votes of their supporters plus the share of the swing voters whose support they gain in the
campaign competition. Formally, the expected rents for the two parties are as follows:
UA = (G− pA)
(
yA +
1
2
(1 + pA − pB)(1− yA − yB)
)
(1)
UB = (G− pB)
(
yB +
1
2
(1 + pB − pA)(1− yA − yB)
)
(2)
where, under the assumption of uniform distribution of political preferences, 12(1 + pA −
pB) is the share of swing voters preferring (and voting) partyA and 12(1+pB−pA) is the
share of swing voters supporting party B. Finally, (1− yA − yB) is the share of swing
voters in the electorate.
The reaction functions of the two parties can be obtained from the first order condi-
tions of expected rent maximization.
2We assume that r is large enough so that there is full turnout.
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For party A the first order condition is:
∂UA
∂pA
= (G− pA)(1− yA − yB)− 2yA − (1 + pA − pB)(1− yA − yB) = 0
and the reaction function is:3
pA(pB) =
G− 1
2
+
pB
2
− yA
1− yA − yB
Notice that the larger the share of own supporters, the small the public good provision the
party is willing to promise. This is due to UA being submodular in yA and pA.4
∂UA
∂pA∂yA
= −(G− pA)− (1− pA + pB) < 0.
For party B the first order condition is:
∂UB
∂pB
= (G− pB)(1− yA − yB)− 2yB − (1− pA + pB)(1− yA − yB) = 0
and the reaction function is:5
pB(pA) =
G− 1
2
+
pA
2
− yB
1− yA − yB
The campaign competition equilibrium is defined by the two campaign promises of
public good provision:
p∗A = G−
3 + yA − yB
3(1− yA − yB) (3)
p∗B = G−
3− yA + yB
3(1− yA − yB) (4)
Notice that the party with a larger share of core supporters will promise lower public
good provision. In other words, the stronger the unconditional support in the electorate,
the larger the expected rents from office for a party. The percentage of swing voters
3The expected rent is strictly concave because ∂
2UA
∂pA2
= − (1− yA − yB) < 0 and the second
order condition is always met.
4For a definition of sub modularity see Amir (2005).
5As for party A, the expected rent of party B is strictly concave and submodular in yB and pB .
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supporting party A is:
x∗ =
1
2
− yA − yB
3(1− yA − yB) (5)
and the total share of votes for party A is:
sA = yA + x
∗(1− yA − yB). (6)
We can compute the expected level of public good provision, equal to the sum of the
public good expenditure promised by the two parties weighted by their probabilities of
forming the government.
E[p] = sAp
∗
A + (1− sA)p∗B
= G− 3− yA + yB
3 (1− yA − yB) −
(yA − yB) (3 + yA − yB)
9 (1− yA − yB) (7)
The expected rents for the two parties are:
UA
? =
(3 + yA − yB)2
18 (1− yA − yB) (8)
UB
? =
(3− yA + yB)2
18 (1− yA − yB) (9)
Intuitively, the expected rents for parties are increasing in the share of their core supporters
and decreasing in the share of their competitor’s core supporters. Moreover, both parties’
rents negatively depend on the share of swing voters, as they have to compete in public
good provision to convince those voters and so they are willing to spend more when they
are a large fraction of the electorate.
2.2 Competition in the market for votes when mafia is avail-
able
In areas where organized crime has a firm control of the territory, a further alternative
is available to parties. They can buy votes from the mafia which we assume is able to
“convince” voters to support that specific party. There are several reasons to believe that
a criminal organization, with a network of members infiltrated in the social and economic
fabric of the territory, and using violence to affirm their power may shift votes to the
supported party. As Gambetta (1993) highlighted, the market for votes with its problems
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of verification and trust on both the buyer and seller side, is an ideal setting for mafia
operations. Of course the level of electoral manipulation depends on the strength of its
control on the territory, whether this control is unchallenged and on the size of the whole
organization.
We model the interaction between the political parties and this intermediary in the
market for votes as a four-stage game of perfect information where in the first stage the
two political parties compete for mafia services by offering a price per vote mi with
i = A,B. In the second stage the criminal organization chooses the party to support
by picking the most profitable offer. The third stage is the campaign competition which
is played as explained in the previous section, while in the fourth stage the mafia chooses
the amount of voters to persuade to switch their votes away from the other party and in
favor of the party supported by the mafia. This activity is costly for the mafia which
will choose the number of voters optimally (i.e., maximizing its profits). We look for the
subgame-perfect equilibrium and solve the game by backward induction.6
Starting from the fourth stage, the mafia maximizes its profits by choosing the optimal
quantity of votes to switch, given the price offered by the party winning the competition
in the first stage. Assuming a quadratic cost function for the mafia, its profits are defined
by:
ΠM = miyM − y
2
M
2e
∂ΠM
∂yM
= mi − yM
e
= 0
y?M = emi
where mi is the price per vote offered by party i, yM are the votes controlled by the mafia
to the advantage of party i, and e is an efficiency measure of the mafia organization. The
higher the efficiency, the larger the number of votes provided by the mafia for any given
price per vote paid by the political party.
In the third stage, there are two scenarios: one in which the criminal organization is
working for party A, and the other where it supports party B.
6We assume voters’ political preferences to be public knowledge. Relaxing this assumption
produces qualitatively identical results, but unnecessarily complicates the algebra, making the
interpretation of the close form solutions less accessible.
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When mafia supports party A the rent functions of the two parties are:
UA = (G− pA)
(
yA + y
?
M +
1
2
(1 + pA − pB)(1− yA − yB)
)
−mAy?M
UB = (G− pB)
(
yB − y?M +
1
2
(1 + pB − pA)(1− yA − yB)
)
From the first order condition of expected rent maximization we obtain the reaction func-
tions of the two parties:
pA(pB) =
G− 1
2
+
pB
2
− yA + y
?
M
1− yA − yB
pB(pA) =
G− 1
2
+
pA
2
− yB − y
?
M
1− yA − yB
The equilibrium public good provision promises are therefore given by:
pM?A = G−
3 + yA − yB + 2y?M
3(1− yA − yB)
p?B = G−
3− yA + yB − 2y?M
3(1− yA − yB)
where the superscript M indicates the party supported by the mafia.
Suppose now that the mafia supports party B. The rents of the two parties become:
UA = (G− pA)
(
yA − y?M +
1
2
(1 + pA − pB)(1− yA − yB)
)
UB = (G− pB)
(
yB + y
?
M +
1
2
(1 + pB − pA)(1− yA − yB)
)
−mBy?M
The reaction functions of the two parties are:
pA(pB) =
G− 1
2
+
pB
2
− yA − y
?
M
1− yA − yB
pB(pA) =
G− 1
2
+
pA
2
− yB + y
?
M
1− yA − yB
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and the equilibrium campaign expenditures are given by:
p?A = G−
3 + yA − yB − 2y?M
3(1− yA − yB)
pM?B = G−
3− yA + yB + 2y?M
3(1− yA − yB)
In the second stage the mafia chooses the best of the offers made by the two parties.
The party with the highest price per vote wins the competition.
Moving to the first stage, the parties choose the price per vote offered to the mafia.
Substituting the equilibrium values of the campaign competition strategies and the opti-
mizing behavior of the mafia in the expected utilities of party A we get:
VMA =
4e2m2A + (3 + yA − yB)2 + 4emA(3 + yA − yB)
18(1− yA − yB) − em
2
A (10)
VA =
(3− 2emB + yA − yB)2
18(1− yA − yB) (11)
where VMA is the expected rent of winning the competition for mafia support by offering
the pricemA, while VA is the expected rent of losing the competition when the other party
offers mB to the mafia.
Similarly, we derive the expected utilities of party B:
VMB =
4e2m2B + (3− yA + yB)2 + 4emB(3− yA + yB)
18(1− yA − yB) − em
2
B (12)
VB =
(3− 2emA − yA + yB)2
18(1− yA − yB) (13)
where, as before, VMB is the expected rent of winning mafia support offering mB and VB
is the expected rent of losing the competition when party A offers mA to the mafia.
Competition in stage 1 is a Bertrand competition where the two parties try to outbid
the rival by offering a higher price for securing the mafia support. There is an upper limit,
however, to the price offered by parties. In fact, by comparing VMi and Vi with i = A,B
with mA = mB = m we can show that
VMA ≥ VA if m ∈
[
0,
4(3 + yA − yB)
9(1− yA − yB)
]
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and
VMB ≥ VB if m ∈
[
0,
4(3− yA + yB)
9(1− yA − yB)
]
When the price offered exceeds the upper bound of this set, party A prefers to lose the
backing of the mafia to its rival.
However, there is also a minimum price the parties are willing to pay to the mafia.
In fact, when the rival offers a very low price, each party can do better than just outbid
the rival. Given that the price offered also determines the quantity of votes switched by
the mafia, each party as an optimal (minimum) price which maximize their expected rent
when they are unconstrained by the rival party; we could call this the monopsonist price.
This minimum prices for the two parties are:
mA =
3 + yA − yB
9 (1− yA − yB)− 2e (14)
mB =
3− yA + yB
9 (1− yA − yB)− 2e (15)
The reaction function of party A can therefore be defined as:
mˆA(mB) = min
{
max
{
mA,mB + 
}
,
4(3 + yA − yB)
9(1− yA − yB)
}
(16)
Party B’s reaction function is instead:
mˆB(mA) = min
{
max
{
mB,mA + 
}
,
4(3− yA + yB)
9(1− yA − yB)
}
(17)
The following proposition highlights our first result concerning the first stage of the
game.
Proposition 1. The party with the largest share of core supporters always wins the com-
petition to secure the backing of the mafia.
Proof. By comparing the largest offer the two parties are willing to make as summarized
in the equations of the two reaction functions (16) and (17), whenever yi > yj party i has
the highest evaluation of mafia service and is willing to outbid the rival party j.
The intuition of the result is quite straightforward. Since the party with the largest
share of supporters chooses a lower electoral promise, its marginal rent is larger than the
rival’s and is therefore willing to pay a higher price to the mafia for each vote.
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Under the assumption that party A has a larger share of supporters we can compute
the equilibrium choices in all the stages of the game and the expected rent of the two
parties. In the first stage, the equilibrium can be defined as follows:7
mA
? =
4(3− yA + yB)
9(1− yA − yB)
m?B = , with  ∈ (0,
4(3− yA + yB)
9(1− yA − yB)
In the second stage the mafia chooses to support party A who made the highest bid in the
first stage.
In the third stage of the game the two parties set the following promises of public
good provision:
p∗∗A = G−
3 + yA − yB
3(1− yA − yB) −
2yM
3(1− yA − yB) = p
∗
A −
2yM
3(1− yA − yB) (18)
p∗∗B = G−
3− yA + yB
3(1− yA − yB) +
2yM
3(1− yA − yB) = p
∗
B +
2yM
3(1− yA − yB) (19)
where p∗A and p
∗
B are the equilibrium value in the competition without the mafia analyzed
in section 2.1.
The share of swing voters preferring party A is:
x∗∗ =
1
2
− yA − yB
3(1− yA − yB) −
2yM
3(1− yA − yB) (20)
= x∗ − 2yM
3(1− yA − yB)
where x∗ is the share of swing voters voting for party A when the mafia is not available
as defined in equation (5).
Finally, in the forth stage of the game the mafia chooses the optimal share of party
B’s voters to convince to switch to party A:8
yM
? =
4 (3− yA + yB) e
9(1− yA − yB) (21)
7The proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand competition solution.
8Here we are assuming that the mafia is able to identify both supporters of party B and swing
voters convinced by party B’s campaign, and to convince yM? of them to vote for party A instead.
So there is an upper limit to the share of voters that the mafia can switch, which is given by
yB + x
∗∗ (1− yA − yB).
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As it is clear from equation (20), the fraction of swing voters choosing the party sup-
ported by the mafia is smaller than without mafia. The overall effect of mafia availability
on the total share of votes gained by the supported party is summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2. The support of the mafia increases supported party’s share of votes.
Proof. The total share of votes gained by partyA when mafia support is available is equal
to
sMA = yA + y
?
M + x
??(1− yA − yB).
By substituting the equation (20) in the previous expression we get
sMA = yA + y
?
M + x
∗(1− yA − yB)− 2y
?
M
3(1− yA − yB)(1− yA − yB) (22)
= yA + x
∗(1− yA − yB) + 1
3
y?M > yA + x
∗(1− yA − yB) = sA
where sA, defined in equation (6), is the share of votes gained by party A when mafia
support is not available.
Interestingly, the increase in the vote share of the party supported by the mafia does
not imply an increase in the rent of that party. The following proposition summarizes the
impact of the electoral involvement of the mafia on players’ utilities.
Proposition 3. The availability of mafia in the electoral market lowers the expected rent
of both parties and voters.
Proof. First we show that the expected rent of the two parties is lower when the mafia
is available (as defined by equations 10 for party A and 13 for party B) than without the
mafia (equations 8 and 9 for party A and B respectively).
For party B the comparison is straightforward since
VB =
(3− 2em?A − yA + yB)2
18(1− yA − yB) <
(3− yA + yB)2
18 (1− yA − yB) = UB
?
For party A, rearranging equation (10) we have that
VMA =
(3 + yA − yB)2
18(1− yA − yB) + 4em
?
A
em?A + 3 + yA − yB − 92m?A(1− yA − yB)
18(1− yA − yB)
= U?A + 4em
?
A
em?A + 3 + yA − yB − 92m?A(1− yA − yB)
18(1− yA − yB)
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Therefore, to show that VMA < U
?
A, it is enough to show that
em?A + 3 + yA − yB −
9
2
m?A(1− yA − yB) < 0
Since y?M = em
?
A and the value of m
?
A is defined in equation (18), we can rewrite the
previous expression as follows:
y?M + 3 + yA − yB − 2(3− yA − yB) < 0
y?M < 3(1− yA + yB)
But since y?M can never be larger that the largest possible share of votes for party B, that
is yB + (1− yA), it follows that
y?M ≤ 1− yA + yB < 3(1− yA + yB)
which is enough to show that
VMA = U
?
A + 4em
?
A
em?A + 3 + yA − yB − 9/2m?A(1− yA − yB)
18(1− yA − yB) < U
?
A.
As for the utility of voters, notice first that it monotonically increases in the amount
of expected public good provision. Recall that the expected level of public good provision
is given by the weighted sum of the promises made by the two parties where the shares of
votes are the weights, which is:
E[pM ] = sMA p
??
A +
(
1− sMA
)
p??B
=
(
sA +
y∗M
3
)(
p∗A −
2y∗M
3(1− yA − yB)
)
+
(
1− sA − y
∗
M
3
)(
p∗B +
2y∗M
3(1− yA − yB)
)
= sAp
∗
A + (1− sA)p∗B −
4y∗2M
9(1− yA − yB) − (pB − pA)
y∗M
3
+
2y∗M (2sA − 1)
3(1− yA − yB)
where sA , p∗A and p
∗
B are respectively the share of votes gained by party A, the public
good promises by party A and B when the mafia is not available, as defined by the equa-
tions (6), (3) and (4). To complete the proof is enough to use the equation (7) that defines
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the expected public good provision without the mafia and rearrange the terms such that
E[pM ] = E[p]− 4y
∗
M
9(1− yA − yB) (y
∗
M + ya − yB) .
Proposition 3 clarifies that the involvement of the mafia in electoral matter is highly
wasteful for society. First, despite the direct electoral advantages for the party supported
by the mafia, both parties would strictly prefer fair competition in the electoral campaign.
In the presence of the mafia, parties get trapped into a spiraling competition in which the
only winner is the mafia acting as a monopolist.
Second, beside the direct restriction on electoral freedom, the presence of mafia also
negatively affects voters through the decrease in expected public good provision. Since the
party recurring to the electoral services provided by the mafia will substantially decrease
the public good provision in case of gaining office, the overall impact on the expected
public good provision in negative.
Finally the next Proposition, provides two interesting comparative statics results.
Proposition 4. The electoral manipulation by the mafia and the electoral profits of the
mafia increase in the efficiency of the mafia and in electoral competition.
Proof. The first part of the proof is straightforward, as the higher the efficiency (measured
by the parameter e) the larger the optimal number of votes provided by the mafia (y?M =
em?A) and the higher mafia’s profits.
For the second part of the proof, define the tightness electoral competition as the
difference between party A and party B core supporters, (yA − yB), with maximal com-
petition occurring when both parties have the same share of core supporters. The price
paid by the party winning the competition for mafia support is defined by equation (18)
which is decreasing in (yA − yB). So the smaller the difference between core supporters,
the higher the price paid to the mafia, the larger the electoral manipulation y?M , and the
larger the profits earned by the mafia.
The first result in Proposition 4 is pretty intuitive: when the mafia is more efficient in
controlling and delivering votes, then the amount of votes which will be manipulated at
equilibrium increases. Similarly, the total profit for the mafia increases.
The second comparative statics addressed in the proposition is more subtle. Recall
that the equilibrium price paid to the mafia by party A (endowed with a larger share of
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core supporters) matches the highest price party B is willing to offer. Increasing electoral
competition, i.e. making the two parties more and more alike, decreases the maximal price
offered by A and increases the maximal price offered by party B. This, in turn, implies
that the equilibrium price offered by party A will increase, leading to a larger number of
votes manipulated by the mafia and an increase in its electoral profit.
Our simple theoretical framework produced a number of predictions which may be
subject to empirical investigation. With the exception of Proposition 3, addressing the
change in utilities for players and hence difficult to confront with an empirical verification,
our theory can be extremely useful to guide our empirical study on the impact of the
Sicilian mafia on Italian elections. Based on our analysis we formulate the following
hypotheses:
1. The (electorally) strongest party gains the support of the mafia (Proposition 1);
2. The vote share of the strongest party is increased by the mafia, where the mafia is
available (Proposition 2);
3. The tighter the electoral competition and the more efficient is the mafia, the larger
the electoral manipulation operated by the mafia (Proposition 4);
4. The reward paid to the mafia in exchange of its electoral support increases in elec-
toral competition and in the efficiency of the mafia (Proposition 4).
Before moving to the actual empirical analysis, a brief background should empower
the reader with the fundamental information on the context considered.
3 Italian politics between 1946-1992 and the Sicilian
mafia
3.1 Italian politics after WWII
Two key elements of Italian politics are crucial for understanding the involvement of the
Sicilian mafia in the electoral market. First, the postwar Italian political system between
1946 and 1992 was characterized by the constant presence of the Christian Democratic
party (DC) as the leading party in government. This party dominated government first
in coalition with other small center parties, and from 1964 also with the Socialist party
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(PSI). The primacy of DC was never questioned and the standard expectation was that
this party would have ruled indefinitely. Or, at least this was the general belief until
the 1970s when the main opposition party, the Communist party, PCI, became a much
stronger competitor. In Figure 1 we plot the percentage gap between the two main parties
from 1948 in all Italian regions except Sicily, and Sicily.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Before the 1970 the gap between the vote shares for DC and PCI, the second largest
party, was well above 10% throughout Italy. During the 1970s, however, the relative
power of the two parties changed dramatically: the risk of a leftist government led by the
PCI became more tangible. Interestingly, the reduction in the gap did not occur in Sicily.
In the mid 1970s, the difference between the DC-PCI gap in Sicily and in the rest of Italy
was above ten percentage points. The difference in electoral outcomes in Sicily and in
the rest of the country may, of course, be explained by several factors, but the presence of
these different patterns leaves the opportunity to explore further the role that the Sicilian
mafia may have played in the electoral competition. The pattern in Figure 1 is broadly
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model: when electoral competition be-
comes stronger, the dominant party receives a more consistent electoral support from the
mafia.
The second important feature of Italian politics during the period studied, is the trend
in public investments. The size of government spending, especially in its discretionary
component, started to increase steadily achieving its peak in the late 1960s (see Figure
2). This is likely to have loosened the budget constraint for parties enabling a variety of
methods to potentially fund any electoral deal with the mafia, including public procure-
ment contracts.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
3.2 The Sicilian mafia and its relationships with politics
According to one of the main prosecutors of the Sicilian mafia: “There is only one mafia,
[...] the mafia, which is a criminal association. [It is] efficient and dangerous, structured
in agglomerations, or groups or families or, even better, ‘cosche’.” (Tribunale di Palermo,
1981, p.208–9)9 Hence, the primary mafia enterprise is the family, “a territorial based
9Judge Terranova was killed in Palermo in 1979.
18
organization, which controls an area of a city or a village from where it takes its name.”
(Tribunale di Palermo, 1985, p.73)
The family remained the main structure for long time and the relationship between
families existed but were not structured and consisted of alliances, clustering of small
families, and exchange of labor and services (Gambetta, 1993).
From the end of the 1950s a series of attempts were made in order to establish a
structure able to co-ordinate the different families (Tribunale di Palermo, 1985). Before
that there was no clear structure linking families and coordinating its criminal efforts:
“[They] were a mosaic of small republics with topographical borders marked by tradi-
tion.”(Tribunale di Palermo, 1981, p.656)10 But it was only towards the end of the 1960s,
after the first mafia war in 1962-63, that a real reorganization of Cosa Nostra started.
Particularly important was in 1969 the killing of a boss who was held responsible of
the first mafia war. According to justice witnesses the killing was executed by members
of several families from Palermo, Catania and Caltanissetta, highlighting a new alliance
across Sicily which would have given rise to the Regional Commission few years later. In
1970 three bosses are given the task to reorganize the families in the Palermo province
and in 1973 its Provincial Commission is reorganized (Lupo, 1996, p.278-9). Few years
later, in 1975, the “regional commission” was established with representatives from all
the provincial commissions.(Lupo, 1996, p.279) Such a structure was also evidence that
mafia organizations were now present in most of the island. However the strength of the
criminal organization in the different provinces was still relevant. As Buscetta put it, “in
a scale from 1 to 10, Palermo is 10, Agrigento 8, Trapani 8, Caltanissetta 6, Catania 4”.11
(Lupo, 1996, p. 276)
With the consolidation of the centralized structure of Cosa Nostra a new phase char-
acterized by high profile mafia killing came about, which culminated with the elimination
of judges Falcone and Borsellino in 1992.
The relationship between the mafia and the political and administrative powers in
Sicily dates back to the XIX century. For instance, in 1893 Marquis Notarbartolo di San
Giovanni, former mayor of Palermo and governor of Banco di Sicilia, was stabbed to
death by mafia killers allegedly by the request of MP Palizzolo who was first found guilty
and then eventually acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence after a ten-year long trial.12
10This passage is reported in Gambetta (1993, p.110).
11Notice that he does not mention Messina, Siracusa and Ragusa.
12See Dickie (2004, pp. 87–130) for an interesting account of the Palermo high society where
this murdered occurred, as well as of the trial. See also Salvemini (2000) for a crude account of
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At the beginning of the fascist dictatorship the relationships with the political power
were interrupted by a tough repression started in 1925 by the prefect Mori, but mafia
was not eradicated.13 After WWII many old mafiosi who survived the Fascism supported
the Sicilian separatist movement, which eventually did not succeed. Meanwhile, a new
political force was emerging as the leading Italian governing party, the DC. Until the
1960s, however, there was no structured relationship with one party for all the mafia
families which were reorganizing in the postwar years.
But things change in the late 1960s. As reported by several mafiosi turned justice wit-
nesses, from the seventies the Regional Commission started to suggest to the families of
Cosa Nostra the parties and the politicians to support at the elections (Arlacchi, 2010, p.
182). In 1969, MP Salvo Lima and his acolytes, which constituted the most majority fac-
tion of Sicilian DC, joined the Andreotti faction in Sicily, which was later supported also
by Vito Ciancimino, major of Palermo and MP. It has been established by several tribunals
these two politicians were the main references for the most important mafia families of
Palermo and Corleone, respectively. Therefore, even though some mafia families had al-
ways maintained relationships with politicians on an individual basis, the constitution of
the mafia cartel on one side, and the aggregation of the most relevant mafia friends in the
same political family on the other, made the relationship between the mafia underworld
and the DC stronger and more significant.14
How was the actual control of votes working in a system characterized by an Aus-
tralian secret ballot?
There were several methods to get circumvent vote secrecy. A first sophisticated
technique, known as the “rotating ballot works like this: All papers have to be placed
in an envelope before being dropped into the ballot box, and these envelopes have to be
signed by the election official. The uomo di rispetto obtains such signed envelope before
the election; on election day he assembles all the voters dependent on him at his house
(...). He then motions the first one up to him and hands him the envelope which already
the relationship of the political establishment and the main national political figures who held the
political power in Italy in the two decades from 1890 to 1910.
13It is interesting to notice that when the inquests touched the Sicilian Fascist party, in 1928, he
was promoted senator.
14The late MP Giulio Andreotti has been incriminated and later acquitted for “having con-
tributed in non-occasional manner to protecting the interests and reaching the aims of the criminal
association known as Cosa Nostra.” However the court ruled that he “made himself available to
mafiosi in authentic, stable and friendly way until the spring of 1980” when the murder of the DC
president of the Sicilian Region, Piersanti Mattarella, occurred. (Dickie, 2004, p.322–3)
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contains a checked ballot. The voter has to take this to the polling station, where he is
officially hand an envelope by the electoral official. He then secretly switches the two and
drops the previously prepared one into the box. With the new envelope he returns to his
patron’s house, where the process is repeated.” (Hess, 1973, p.155-156)
Another methods, particularly used in the period considered in this paper, exploited
some peculiar features of the multi-preference proportional system. Schneider and Schnei-
der (1976) highlight how a electoral system where voters can vote for some candidates
from a list, opens the possibility to vote control by asking voters to cast their vote in a
particular order. Furthermore, since the district for each polling station is usually very
small (500 voters on average) [...], it is possible to verify quite easily if the votes has been
cast as agreed. Schneider and Schneider (1976) report what they saw in the polling sta-
tions in Villamaura, Palermo which they visited in occasion of the parliamentary elections
in 1968. They took note of the votes expressed on the ballot papers and highlighted that
“while many voters had made their choices in the same order, there where many papers
which showed particular combinations revealing the vote control [...]. Our impression has
been confirmed by party members present at the ballot.” (Schneider and Schneider, 1976,
p. 221)
These and alternative methods, some of which resorting to direct intimidation, em-
powered the mafia with a precious package of votes to trade with politicians in exchange
for favorable policies and lucrative businesses.
4 Data
We gathered electoral data for all 370 Sicilian municipalities.15 The electoral data is
taken from Atlante storico-elettorale d’Italia (Corbetta and Piretti, 2009), a collection of
all electoral results for Italian election from 1861 to 2008. We focus only on 12 National
elections in the period after the end of WWII: 1946-1992, the period referred to as “First
Republic”. After 1992 a political earthquake took place in Italy changing radically the
spectrum of parties in the political arena and some key feature of the electoral system,
which make any comparison challenging. More specifically, our dependent variable is
the share of votes obtained by DC, computed for each election as the number of votes
obtained in a given municipality, divided by the total number of valid votes expressed in
15Notice that, given the proportional nature of the electoral system, manipulating the vote in
Sicily would have an impact on the overall Italian electoral results.
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that municipality. Figure 3 reports the average share of votes obtained by DC across the
12 elections considered by municipality.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The data on the distribution of the mafia across Sicily are taken from a report by the
military police (Carabinieri) submitted in 1987 to a parliamentary committee (Comando
Generale dell’Arma dei Carabinieri, 1987). This report analyzes the activities of orga-
nized crime in Italy and its evolution in the mid 1980s. In one of the attachments, the
Carabinieri list the main mafia families, and provide for each of them the name of the
boss and the town where it was based.16 Gambetta (1993, p.82), used the data provided
by this report to show how the distribution of the Sicilian mafia has changed little in its
centenary history; however these data have never been used for empirical investigations.
80 out of 390 Sicilian municipalities were identified as mafia strongholds of the main
families. Of these families 19 were based in the city of Palermo, 29 in the rest of the
Palermo province, 36 families in the Agrigento province, 15 in the Trapani province, 5 In
the Caltanissetta province, and 4 each in the Catania and Messina provinces. We create
a dummy variable which takes on value one when the municipality is listed in the report
as the stronghold of a mafia family. In Figure 4 we display in blue mafia municipalities
according to this source. Alternative measures for the mafia are used in this work. A
measure of mafia prevalence in 1900 by municipality is derived by Cutrera (1900), and it
is used to instrument for more recent mafia distribution.17 The measure based on Cutrera
(1900) ranges from 0 (no mafia), to 3 (for municipalities with strong mafia presence).18
16In those years the knowledge of the structure of Cosa Nostra was greatly enhanced by the
testimony of several important mafiosi turned justice witnessed. Their contribution was vital for
the most important trial against the Sicilian mafia, the maxiprocesso (maxi trial) which started in
1986 and ended in the December 1987 when 342 alleged mafiosi were sentenced to a total of 2665
years in addition to 19 life sentences. In January 1992 the Italian Supreme Court largely confirmed
the verdict of the maxi trial and few months later two of the prosecutors, Judges G. Falcone and P.
Borsellino, were murdered in two separate bomb attacks.
17Police inspector Antonino Cutrera analyzed in its work the origins and the characteristics of
the mafia, its role in the recent Sicilian history, the initiation rituals and its structure. Based on its
knowledge of the mafia both in Palermo and in the rest of the highland he depicted a map of the
presence and intensity of the mafia in 289 municipalities and villages.
18In 1900 Sicily had 357 municipalities organized in 7 provinces. Cutrera identified 84 munic-
ipalities where there was no mafia, 66 where there was little presence, 70 where the mafia was of
minor importance, and 69 municipalities with a major presence of the mafia. 68 municipalities
were unclassified. According to Cutrera, in 38% of the municipalities in the Palermo province
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Finally, we also use a news-based measure of the presence of mafia compiled by a
centre of study on the mafia at the University of Messina (Centro studi e documentazione
sulla criminalità mafiosa, Università di Messina, 1994). They produced a map with the
details of all the mafia families cited on the news, and the municipalities where they had
an influence on. As for our main measure of mafia presence, this is a dummy variable
taking up value one for municipality where the mafia operates.
We collect an extensive set of socio-economic and education controls, computed by
interpolation for elections years, from the official Census for 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981,
1991, and 2001.
The full list of controls is described in Table 1.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
5 Empirical strategy
In line with the previous discussion, to identify the impact of the mafia on electoral out-
comes, we regress the share of votes awarded to the DC (Share DCit) in Italian parlia-
mentary elections on our proxy recording the presence of the mafia at the municipality
level. To capture the increase in the efficiency of the mafia and in the electoral competi-
tion around the 1970s, we add a dummy variable which takes on value one for all elections
following 1970 (after1970), and the interaction term composed by the mafia proxy and
after1970. Along the predictions of our model, secondary sources guided our choice of
the 1970 cutoff point. In section 7 we show that the data also support our choice.
The empirical identification strategy relies on the comparison of the electoral perfor-
mance of the DC across municipalities with high mafia prevalence and those with low
mafia prevalence, before and after 1970. In Figure 5 we report the difference between the
average DC share after and before 1970. A visual comparison with Figure 4 reveals that
the area around Palermo and Trapani (NW of the map), historical stronghold of the Sicil-
ian mafia, experienced an increase in DC shares after 1970, in line with our expectations.
there was a major presence of the mafia, while this was the case in 44% of the municipalities in
the Trapani province, 41% in the Girgenti (the old name of Agrigento) province, 29% in the Cal-
tanissetta province, 15% in the Catania province, 7% in the Messina province. No municipality
was classified as having a major mafia presence in the Siracusa province.
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Formally, our base empirical model can be written as follows:
Share DCit = α1 mafiai + α2 after1970 + γmafiai ∗ after1970 + δt + it (23)
where (δt) is a set of year dummies capturing the time specific variance in electoral out-
comes. The coefficients of interests are α1 and γ. The former captures the average impact
of the mafia on the electoral performance of the DC, whereas the latter identifies any addi-
tional effect kicking in after 1970. According to our theory, both coefficients are expected
to be positive.
We gradually augment our basic specification with nine dummies for Sicilian provinces,
the set of time-varying contemporaneous socio-economic controls, and the set of time-
varying contemporaneous education controls.
In an alternative specification we replace provincial dummies with neighbor-pair fixed
effects and basically compare DC electoral performance in directly neighboring munic-
ipalities, with and without mafia operations (Acemoglu et al. 2012). This allows us to
control for any unobserved confounding factor common across municipality boundaries.
Finally, we run a municipality fixed-effect specification, which we consider our most
trustworthy model. Obviously, the effect of mafia on DC results drops from the equation
given the time-invariant nature of our mafia measures. We concentrate, however, on the
interaction term identifying the effect of mafia on DC electoral results after 1970.
A significant correlation in equation (23), however, may not represent a causal rela-
tionship. First, it may be explained by reversed causality: the mafia may proliferate in
areas in which the DC have strong support, or alternatively may be used by the DC in
municipality in which they feel electorally disadvantaged. Second, despite our compre-
hensive sets of control and the municipality fixed effects specifications, there may still be
omitted variables that are correlated both with the presence of mafia and the vote for DC.
In addition, it is not unlikely that mafia prevalence is measured with error. If this is the
case, our results may suffer from an attenuation bias. To address these concerns, we turn
to an instrumental variable strategy. We instrument for our mafia proxy using a measure
of mafia presence as recorded by Cutrera (1900) (mafia 1900), when the DC did not
exist yet. The interaction term is instrumented with mafia 1900 ∗ after 1970.
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6 Empirical results
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (23).19 The first two columns suggest
that municipalities in which the mafia operates feature less support for the DC but this
effect is mitigated after 1970, when allegedly the deal with the mafia deepened. Inter-
estingly, when we add contemporaneous socio-economic controls in column (3), the co-
efficient for mafia turns insignificant, whereas the interaction term remain positive and
significant. In all remaining specifications this remains true: after 1970 the DC systemat-
ically obtain a larger share of votes in municipalities where the mafia operates. Control-
ling for municipality neighbor-pair fixed effects and municipality fixed effects confirms
this pattern (columns (5) and (6), respectively). The magnitude of the effect is substantial.
According to results reported in column (6), after 1970 the presence of the mafia increases
in average the share of votes obtained by the DC by roughly 3 percentage points, which
compares with the average obtained by this party in Sicily of around 44% across the entire
period considered.
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In the last two columns of Table 2 we show our IV results. We report only the most
demanding specifications, where we use the full set of controls and control for neighbor-
pair and municipality fixed-effects. In both specifications, the first stage F-tests are very
large and always above 10.20
The 2SLS estimations confirms OLS findings: after 1970 the DC systematically ob-
tain a larger share of votes in municipalities where the mafia operates. The magnitude of
the influence is larger than the one found with OLS. According to the results reported in
column (8), where we control for municipality fixed effects, after 1970 the presence of
the mafia increases by around 6 percentage points the share of votes gained by the DC.
All specifications document a dramatic increase in the electoral manipulation by the
mafia in favor of the DC after 1970. This is consistent with the predictions of our model
that the organizational restructuring of the mafia coupled with the increase of electoral
competition would have increased the influence of the mafia on electoral outcomes.
Interestingly, our estimated impact of the mafia on electoral results are remarkably
similar to the accounts reported by ex mafia members. For instance, the justice witness
Antonino Calderone reports that, “only in the province of Palermo” the mafia can count
19All standard errors in the paper are clustered at the municipality level.
20All first stage results are available upon request.
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on “75,000-100,000 votes in favor of political parties and friendly politicians” (Arlacchi,
2010, p.183). The electorate of the Province of Palermo, an area with a high density
of mafia prevalence, slightly exceeds one million voters. The 6-8 additional percentage
points, awarded in average to the DC in municipalities with mafia activities (columns
(7)-(8)), imply that the mafia is able to move about 60,000-80,000 votes in that province!
In Table 3 we replicate the last four columns of Table 2 adding the lagged dependent
variable to our list of controls. Our results remain qualitatively identical and working
out the average impact of mafia on DC electoral performance after 1970, we obtain a
remarkably similar magnitude.
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7 Robustness checks
We perform three types of robustness checks. First, we test if our results hold with alter-
native proxies for mafia presence. Second, we check whether our choice about the cutoff
point after which the electoral deal becomes relevant is to be identified around 1970, as
suggested by secondary sources and by our theoretical framework. Third, we run a falsi-
fication test checking whether we can obtain similar results when considering alternative
political parties.
The first set of robustness checks concerns the adoption of alternative measures for
the mafia presence. In the first four columns of Table 4 we repeat the most demanding es-
timations of Table 2 adopting the news-based measure of the mafia presence (Centro studi
e documentazione sulla criminalità mafiosa, Università di Messina, 1994). The results
are entirely consistent with our findings. The magnitude of the effects is almost identical,
both for the OLS and the 2SLS estimates. Similarly, in the last column of Table 4, we
substitute our mafia proxy with the measure of the mafia presence in 1900 as recorded by
Cutrera (1900). We replicate the most demanding specifications using municipality fixed
effects. Results are qualitatively identical. Taking into account the different range of the
measure of mafia in 1900 (0-3), also the magnitude is very similar. In municipality with
a strong presence of the mafia (mafia (1900) = 3), the DC obtains in average about 3
additional percentage points. We consider the test adopting the measure of mafia in 1900
particularly powerful as it also constitutes a “substitute” to our IV strategy. The measure
of mafia presence in 1900 is less likely to be endogenous in the model explaining the vote
shares of the DC roughly seventy years later.
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Next, we check whether the data also support our choice of 1970 as starting point
for the electoral deal between the mafia and the DC. In our analysis we identified 1970
as a likely date for the starting point of the electoral deal between the DC and the mafia.
This choice was guided by our theoretical framework which indicates that the restructur-
ing of the Sicilian mafia coupled with the sharp increase in electoral competition should
have increased substantially the profitability of the electoral deal. In Table 5 we repli-
cate our OLS and 2SLS best specifications (columns (6) and (8)) of Table 2 for different
cutoff points, ranging from 1960 to 1980. The OLS estimates (clumns (1)-(4)) detect
an increase in DC shares in mafia municipalities already earlier than 1970, while the IV
estimates (columns (5)-(8)) identify between 1965 and 1970 as the key point in which
the electoral deal with the mafia takes off (there is only one election taking place in this
period, namely in 1968). A significant coefficient for early cutoff interaction terms (i.e.
with after1960 or after1965), however, does not necessarily imply that the electoral
support by the mafia was already granted earlier than 1970. A sharp increase in DC share
after 1970 would lead to weakly significant interaction terms also for earlier years. To
verify whether the increase in DC shares really occurred in the 1970s and not later, we
replace our interaction term mafia ∗ after1970, with two controls in which mafia is
interacted with the dummies 70s and 80s, taking up value 1 for elections in the periods
1970-1979 and 1980-1992, respectively. Columns (9) and (10) report the results of this
exercise, providing evidence of an increase of DC share in mafia municipalities already in
the 1970s.
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A potential objection to this test and more generally to our results concerns the rele-
vance of our mafia measure across the period considered. Our main measure for capturing
the presence of the mafia has been released in 1987. This is likely to better capture the ge-
ographic distribution of the mafia in the period immediately preceding 1987. This would,
in turn, explain why we find evidence of the electoral deal in the period 1970-1992, in
which our measure is more representative, and not in the 1946-1970. To address this le-
gitimate concern we repeat the test in column (9) of Table 5 replacing our proxy for mafia
with the measure of mafia presence in 1900, which by no means suffers from this criti-
cism. The results, reported in column (11), confirm that in the 1970s DC shares increased
in mafia municipalities.
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We also test whether our result is driven by the structural change in some of our vari-
ables not duly controlled for in our main specification. In Table 6 we split our sample in
two subsamples, before and after 1970, and run our model separately on the two subsam-
ples. The variable of interest in now mafia. Taking into account that we are reducing
the sample by half, our results are largely confirmed. Before 1970 we find no significant
impact of the mafia on DC shares. After 1970, our mafia coefficients are always signifi-
cant for IV estimations, and they are significant for OLS when using the 1987 and 1900
measures of mafia.
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If the electoral deal between the mafia and the DC (the strongest party) was exclusive,
we should not find any similar positive impact of the presence of mafia on the votes
obtained by other political parties. In Table 7 we repeat our estimations substituting the
dependent variable with the share of votes obtained by the right-wing party Italian Social
Movement (MSI) in columns (1)-(4), and the Communist party (PCI) in columns (5)-(8).
All specifications adopt the full set of controls. The OLS results (columns (1), (2), (5)
and (6)) weakly suggest that after 1970 the PCI was getting systematically less votes in
municipalities where mafia is active. The 2SLS results, instead, suggest that after 1970
the MSI was relatively worse off in municipalities with mafia. We can infer with a certain
confidence that the deal with the mafia seemed exclusive prerogative of the DC, at least
in the period considered. Once more, this is consistent with our theory which predicts the
strongest party to have an advantage in securing the mafia support.
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8 Disentangling electoral competition
Proposition 4 in our theoretical section identified two elements increasing the volume of
the electoral deal between the strongest party and the mafia: the efficiency of the mafia
itself and strong electoral competition. In the previous sections, we jointly captured these
two effects by looking at the impact of mafia on DC shares after 1970, based on secondary
sources which suggest an increase in competition and in mafia efficiency around 1970. It
is, however, interesting to isolate the two effects and assess what element has been more
determinant in the Sicilian context.
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In this section we amend our empirical model adding a control for electoral compe-
tition. As a measure of electoral competition we adopt the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), calculated by squaring the vote shares of each party competing in the electoral
arena, and then summing the resulting numbers. Intuitively, the larger the HHI, the lower
the electoral competition. To minimize endogeneity, we compute the HHI for each of the
elections in our sample on the vote shares obtained by the parties for the whole country
excluding Sicily. We introduce the HHI interacted with our mafia measure in our model.
The direct HHI effect is captured by the year fixed effects. Given the structure of the HHI
and according to Proposition 4, we expect the coefficient of the new interaction term to
be negative: the weaker the electoral competition (higher HHI), the smaller the volume
of votes moved by the mafia on behalf of DC. In other words, we expect the additional
votes obtained by DC in mafia municipalities to positively respond to increase in electoral
competition.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 8, where we replicate all specification
of Table 2 with the addition of Mafia ∗HHI . All OLS specifications produces statisti-
cally significant effects both for the interaction term Mafia ∗ after1970, now capturing
the impact of the increase in mafia efficiency only, and for the competition measure. Both
effects go in the expected direction. The increase in mafia efficiency experienced at the
end of 1960s led to an increase in the volume of votes moved in support of DC. The nega-
tive coefficient of Mafia∗HHI implies that stronger electoral competition (lower HHI)
increases DC vote shares in mafia municipalities, in line with our theoretical predictions.
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
The magnitude of the two effects is non negligible. A decrease by one standard de-
viation of HHI predicts an increase of DC shares in mafia municipalities by 0.8%. To
enable a meaningful comparison across the two effects, we compute the average change
in electoral competition before and after 1970 and recover the impact on DC performance
in mafia municipalities due to the competition effect only: according to the results in col-
umn (6) the average increase in electoral competition between the two periods raised DC
average shares in mafia municipalities by close to 0.6%. This compares to the 2% in-
crease of DC shares in mafia municipalities resulting form the increase in mafia efficiency
(using the coefficient of Mafia ∗ after1970 reported in column (6)). The effect of the
increase in mafia efficiency seems to largely dominate in terms of magnitude, at least for
the Sicilian case.
29
This is further confirmed by our IV estimates, reported in the last two columns of
Table 8, where the coefficients for our measure of electoral competition remain of the
same sign but turn insignificant, whereas the coefficients capturing the effect of mafia
after 1970 increase in size.
9 Electoral trade and construction work
So far we identified a clear relationship between the presence of the mafia and the elec-
toral support received by the DC, which suggests the existence of a tacit electoral deal.
Identifying the second part of this deal, and hence the empirical evidence of a change
in the electoral profits of the mafia, is much more challenging. There are a plethora of
channels which may have been used by the DC to reward the support of the mafia: softer
legislation on mafia related crimes, direct intervention to protect mafia members at differ-
ent levels of the judicial trials in which they are involved, and lower investments in mafia
controlling activities (e.g., police presence on the territory) are among the most relevant
channels (Gambetta 1993). Unfortunately, these channels do not easily lend themselves
to quantitative analysis.
An admittedly partial and imperfect test is to look at the magnitude of typical mafia
legal economic activities which can be either fostered or constrained by the public author-
ities. One such economic activity is represented by public construction. Mafia is known
to infiltrate and capture a substantial share of public procurement, and regularly reinvest
much of the revenue from illicit activities in private construction. Public authorities may
allow wilder urban expansion overriding existing regulations, or obscurely award public
contracts to mafia-related entrepreneurs to pay back for the electoral support received by
the mafia.
Once more, it is interesting to consider what mafiosi turned to justice witnesses say
on the issue. In a testimony Leonardo Messina, discussing his family’s involvement in
the control of votes in the province of Caltanissetta, claims that they did it in exchange of
money or other favors, but that “[...] the ultimate goal is public procurement contracts”.21
We do not have data on public procurement contracts by municipality, nor on the
direct urban expansion. Instead, we use the share of workers in construction over the
total labor force as a proxy of construction activities. It is reasonable to assume that
21This is taken from his testimony in front of the parliamentary commission on the mafia (Com-
missione parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle associazioni criminali similari,
1992, p.553)
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if more construction works were allowed in the municipalities in which mafia operated,
more labor force would be employed in this sector. Also, if public construction contracts
are awarded to mafia controlled enterprises, we would expect these firms to employ a
disproportionate number of workers from mafia stronghold municipality, as they would
give a preference to mafia members, their families and friends.
We regress the share of workers in construction over the total labor force on our proxy
recording the presence of mafia at municipality level, the dummy variable after1970, and
the interaction term composed by the mafia proxy and after1970.
Formally, our base empirical model can be written as follows:
Share constructionit = α
′
1 mafiai+α
′
2 after1970+γ
′mafiai∗after1970+δ′t+′it
where the coefficients of interests are α′1 and γ′. We expect both coefficients to track
the trend identified in the electoral deal between the mafia the Christian Democrats. In
particular, we expect the interaction term to be positive and significant, suggesting an
increase in construction works in municipalities with the presence of the mafia after 1970.
We add the full set of controls as in the model on electoral outcomes, excluding the
share of workers in other sectors to avoid mechanic correlation. To address potential en-
dogeneity, we perform a 2SLS estimation in which current mafia presence is instrumented
by historical mafia prevalence (Cutrera, 1900). Finally, we repeat our estimation substi-
tuting our mafia proxy directly with the measure of mafia provided by Cutrera (1900)
and with the alternative measure proposed by the Centro studi e documentazione sulla
criminalità mafiosa, Università di Messina (1994).
All results are reported in Table 9.
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
Overall our results are consistent with the our theoretical prediction: the interaction
term is consistently positive and significant, suggesting that municipality where the mafia
operates have systematically a larger share of labor force employed in the construction
sector. According to the results reported in column (3) where we control for municipal-
ity fixed effects, the average increase in the share of workers in construction due to the
presence of the mafia is close to one percentage point, whereas the IV estimation (column
(5)) predicts an increase by 2 percentage points. Both effects are economically substantial
given that in average 12% of the labor force is employed in construction in Sicily across
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the entire period considered. Like for the estimates on electoral results, adopting the al-
ternative measure of mafia proposed by the University of Messina (1994) and based on
Cutrera (1900) yields extremely similar results (columns (6)-(8)).
The effect on construction activities may, however, capture a general trend in eco-
nomic activities in mafia municipalities and have little to do with the electoral deal we
are studying. To consider seriously this alternative interpretation of our results, we run a
falsification test, in which our dependent variable is replaced by the share of workers in
the communication sector over the labor force, and the share of workers in the industry
sector over the labor force. Table 10 reports the results of this test. Occupation in the com-
munication sector does not display any differential trend in mafia municipalities (columns
(1)-(4)). The increase in mafia efficiency, instead, seems to have hampered after 1970 the
development of the industrial sector in municipalities hosting mafia activities (columns
(5)-(8)).
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
More importantly, based on the results on Table 10, we can be fairly confident that the
increase in construction activities after 1970 in municipalities in which the mafia operates,
may at least partially be the byproduct of the electoral deal linking DC, steadily at the
government in the period considered, and the mafia.
10 Conclusions
In this paper we study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. We iden-
tify two determinants affecting the extent to which parties engage in electoral deals with
criminal organization: first, parties recur to organized crime when it has a tighter control
of the territory, i.e. when it is more effective in controlling votes; secondly, deals with or-
ganized crime become more salient and more decisive in the presence of strong electoral
competition. Using Sicily as a case, we document the impact on the Sicilian mafia on
Italian National Elections in the period 1946-1992. We find evidence consistent with the
existence of a tacit electoral deal between the mafia and the Christian Democrats: starting
from the 1970s, the Christian Democratic party gained consistently larger vote shares in
municipalities in which the mafia operates. The results are robust to a variety of spec-
ifications (including an instrumental variable model) and to the adoption of alternative
measures for the presence of the mafia. The magnitude of the impact is substantial as the
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Christian Democrats obtained in average about six additional percentage point in munici-
pality hosting mafia activities. This is likely to have contributed to the permanence of the
party in the government throughout the Italian First Republic (1946-1992).
Our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political
competition increased dramatically during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced
an extensive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased sub-
stantially its control of the territory.
What did the mafia get in exchange for its support? This side of the electoral deal is
more difficult to disentangle as the channels through which politicians may have payed
back are multiple. We provide suggestive evidence that one channel may have been turn-
ing an eye blind on construction activities violating existing regulations, or awarding pub-
lic contracts on construction to companies with close ties with the mafia.
The end of the First Republic brought the electoral deal with the Christian Democrats
to an abrupt termination. The extent to which the mafia has been left out from the political
sphere in the Second Republic, starting with the 1994 elections has still to be assessed,
although there is some anecdotal and judicial evidence that the deal has simply been
redirected towards new political entities.
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11 Tables and Figures
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Dependent variable:
Votes Share of Christian Democrats 4440 .4445997 .1285866 .0383795 .9375488
Mafia measures:
Mafia (1987) 4440 .2108108 .4079303 0 1
Mafia 1994 4440 .2783784 .4482512 0 1
Mafia 1900 3696 1.396104 1.144984 0 3
Socio-economic controls:
Log(population) 4440 8.685123 1.055002 5.578975 13.46046
Share of population under 25 4440 .4153026 .0598082 .2163483 .5922572
Share of population over 60 4440 .1698943 .0539556 .0422634 .4071822
Share of widow population 4440 .0629075 .0125928 .0311317 .1323493
Share of homemaker population 4440 .2374992 .0940455 .0129376 .5100978
Houses without basic services per capita 4440 .0337927 .06476 0 .4596563
Public servants over labor force 4440 .0665321 .0386736 .0066778 .3083968
Bank employees over labor force 4440 .006274 .0055725 0 .0451353
Transportation workers over labor force 4440 .0375049 .0291148 0 .3990381
Construction workers over labor force 4440 .122627 .0712673 0 .4364844
Industry workers over labor force 4440 .1171493 .0628072 0 .4512137
Agricultural workers over labor force 4440 .4712278 .2181784 .0215335 1
Male in search of first occupation over labor force 4440 .0714561 .0566912 0 .5355995
Education controls:
Share of illiterate population 4440 .1321973 .0776433 .0080819 .447615
Share of population with university degree 4440 .0103832 .0091148 0 .0979253
Share of female population with university degree 4440 .0037076 .0043231 0 .0429713
38
Table 2: The impact of mafia on DC electoral results
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mafia -0.0337*** -0.0442*** -0.00858 -0.00836 -0.00684 0.0389
(0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0377)
Mafia*after1970 0.0226** 0.0226** 0.0323*** 0.0320*** 0.0308*** 0.0282*** 0.0849*** 0.0629**
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0105) (0.0311) (0.0299)
After1970 0.0611*** 0.0611*** 0.0205 -0.00159 0.0123 0.0738 0.121*** 0.174**
(0.00981) (0.00982) (0.0265) (0.0313) (0.0323) (0.0536) (0.0467) (0.0727)
Socio-economic controls      
Education controls     
Province FE   
Neighbor-Pair FE  
Municipality FE  
OLS      
2SLS  
Observations 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370 308 308
R-squared 0.079 0.130 0.228 0.231 0.339 0.191 0.106 0.126
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications control for year fixed effect; excluded instruments
in columns (7)-(8): Mafia 1900 and Mafia 1900*after1970; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 3: Controlling for the lagged dependent variable
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mafia 0.00104 0.0259*
(0.00441) (0.0155)
Mafia*after1970 0.0135*** 0.0163*** 0.0337** 0.0343**
(0.00441) (0.00555) (0.0133) (0.0165)
Lagged share DC 0.641*** 0.434*** 0.606*** 0.416***
(0.0159) (0.0201) (0.0183) (0.0237)
After1970 0.0145 -0.0422*** 0.0279** 0.0469**
(0.0117) (0.0159) (0.0134) (0.0231)
Socio-economic controls    
Education controls    
Neighbor-Pair FE  
Municipality FE  
OLS  
2SLS  
Observations 4,070 4,070 3,388 3,388
Municipalities 370 370 308 308
R-squared 0.652 0.710 0.486 0.249
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All
specifications control for year fixed effect; excluded instruments in columns (3)-(4): Mafia
1900 and Mafia 1900*after1970; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 4: Alternative measures of mafia
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mafia 1994 -0.0121 0.0630
(0.0109) (0.0474)
Mafia 1994*after1970 0.0240** 0.0240** 0.0981*** 0.0694**
(0.0101) (0.00955) (0.0354) (0.0330)
Mafia 1900*after1970 0.00944**
(0.00444)
After1970 0.0134 0.0792 0.156*** 0.198*** 0.183**
(0.0322) (0.0534) (0.0522) (0.0710) (0.0734)
Socio-economic controls     
Education controls     
Neighbor-Pair FE  
Municipality FE   
OLS   
2SLS  
Observations 4,400 4,400 3,696 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 370 370 308 308 308
R-squared 0.338 0.599 0.031 0.118 0.605
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications
control for year fixed effect; excluded instruments in columns (3)-(4): Mafia 1900 and Mafia 1900*af-
ter1970; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 5: Starting point for the electoral deal
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mafia*after1960 0.0225* 0.0510
(0.0126) (0.0346)
Mafia*after1965 0.0251** 0.0565*
(0.0115) (0.0315)
Mafia*after1975 0.0302*** 0.0720**
(0.00984) (0.0293)
Mafia*after1980 0.0302*** 0.0613**
(0.00923) (0.0268)
Mafia*70s 0.0198* 0.0496*
(0.0104) (0.0282)
Mafia*80s 0.0374*** 0.0808**
(0.0119) (0.0353)
Mafia 1900*70s 0.00726*
(0.00425)
Mafia 1900*80s 0.0119**
(0.00512)
Socio-economic controls           
Education controls           
OLS      
2SLS     
Observations 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 4,440 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 308 308 308 308 370 308 308
R-squared 0.190 0.191 0.192 0.191 0.128 0.127 0.124 0.128 0.192 0.163 0.212
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications control for year and municipality fixed effect; excluded instruments in
column (5)-(8): Mafia 1900*after1960, Mafia 1900*after1965, Mafia 1900*after1975, Mafia 1900*after1980, respectively; excluded instruments in column (10): Mafia1900*y70s, and
Mafia1900*y80s; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 6: Splitting the sample in before and after 1970
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Dc before 1970 Votes Share of Dc after 1970
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mafia -0.00807 0.0396 0.0244** 0.116***
(0.0109) (0.0415) (0.0105) (0.0401)
Mafia 1994 -0.0141 0.0531 0.0120 0.160***
(0.0109) (0.0546) (0.0104) (0.0592)
Mafia 1900 0.00520 0.00962*
(0.00645) (0.00520)
Socio-economic controls          
Education controls          
Neighbor-Pair FE          
OLS      
2SLS    
Observations 2,220 1,848 2,220 1,848 1,848 2,220 1,848 2,220 1,848 1,848
Municipalities 370 308 370 308 308 370 308 370 308 308
R-squared 0.384 0.065 0.385 0.050 0.421 0.386 0.106 0.384 -0.071 0.496
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications control for year fixed effect; excluded instruments in columns (2),
(4), (7) and (9): Mafia 1900; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 7: Falsification test - the impact of mafia on votes shares of MSI and PCI
Dependent variable: Votes Share of MSI Votes Share of PCI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mafia -0.0111*** -0.00172 0.00486 -0.0243
(0.00412) (0.0139) (0.00942) (0.0278)
Mafia*after1970 -0.00517 -0.00480 -0.0270** -0.0278** -0.0102* -0.00900* -0.0100 -0.0109
(0.00436) (0.00415) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.00586) (0.00523) (0.0158) (0.0138)
After1970 0.114*** 0.105*** 0.00884 0.0627*** 0.217*** 0.125*** 0.0291 -0.0833**
(0.00929) (0.0170) (0.0136) (0.0210) (0.0222) (0.0265) (0.0332) (0.0338)
Socio-economic controls        
Education controls        
Neighbor-Pair FE    
Municipality FE    
OLS    
2SLS    
Observations 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 370 370 308 308 370 370 308 308
R-squared 0.502 0.517 0.053 0.024 0.642 0.653 0.134 0.080
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications control for year fixed effect; excluded instruments
in columns (3)-(4), (7)-(8): Mafia 1900 and Mafia 1900*after1970; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 8: Disentangling the effect of electoral competition
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mafia 0.0146 0.00419 0.0443** 0.0449** 0.0471** 0.0701
(0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0598)
Mafia*after1970 0.0168* 0.0168* 0.0263** 0.0260** 0.0247** 0.0227** 0.0817*** 0.0624**
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.00990) (0.0297) (0.0286)
Mafia*HHI -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.203*** -0.204*** -0.207*** -0.189*** -0.120 -0.0207
(0.0693) (0.0693) (0.0701) (0.0699) (0.0708) (0.0707) (0.192) (0.186)
After1970 0.0624*** 0.0624*** 0.0232 0.000938 0.0148 0.0747 0.121*** 0.173**
(0.00981) (0.00982) (0.0266) (0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0536) (0.0468) (0.0728)
Socio-economic controls      
Education controls     
Province FE   
Neighbor-Pair FE  
Municipality FE  
OLS      
2SLS  
Observations 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370 308 308
R-squared 0.079 0.130 0.229 0.232 0.340 0.193 0.107 0.127
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications control for year fixed effect; excluded instruments
in columns (7)-(8): Mafia 1900 and Mafia 1900*after1970; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 9: The impact of mafia on construction activities
Dependent variable: Share of construction workers over labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mafia -0.00448 -0.00847* 0.0411*
(0.00541) (0.00476) (0.0218)
Mafia*after1970 0.0114** 0.0105** 0.00919** 0.0371** 0.0220*
(0.00499) (0.00500) (0.00450) (0.0145) (0.0118)
After1970 0.100*** -0.00274 0.115*** -0.0482** -0.00104 -0.0404* -0.0439*
(0.0129) (0.0190) (0.0247) (0.0240) (0.0190) (0.0240) (0.0233)
Mafia 1994*after1970 0.00829** 0.0245*
(0.00388) (0.0132)
Mafia 1900*after1970 0.00337*
(0.00177)
Socio-economic controls        
Education controls        
Province FE  
Neighbor-Pair FE  
Municipality FE     
OLS     
2SLS   
Observations 4,440 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696 4,440 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 370 370 308 308 308 370 308 308
R-squared 0.633 0.670 0.757 0.316 0.560 0.757 0.554 0.772
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications control for year fixed effect; excluded
instruments in columns (4), (5), (7): Mafia 1900 and Mafia 1900*after1970; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Table 10: Falsification test - The impact of mafia on other sectors
Dependent variable: Share of communications workers over labor force Share of industry workers over labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mafia 0.00141 -0.0227 0.00266 0.0149
(0.00393) (0.0138) (0.00470) (0.0169)
Mafia*after1970 0.00129 0.000193 -0.000665 0.00306 -0.0145*** -0.0111** -0.0317** -0.0293**
(0.00219) (0.00192) (0.00573) (0.00463) (0.00535) (0.00512) (0.0145) (0.0143)
After1970 -0.0212*** 0.0111 -0.0362*** 0.0116 -0.0663*** -0.109*** -0.121*** -0.147***
(0.00514) (0.00914) (0.00892) (0.0109) (0.0128) (0.0241) (0.0218) (0.0334)
Socio-economic controls        
Education controls        
Neighbor-Pair FE    
Municipality FE    
OLS    
2SLS    
Observations 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696 4,440 4,440 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 370 370 308 308 370 370 308 308
R-squared 0.524 0.438 0.168 0.233 0.596 0.434 0.478 0.353
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications control for year fixed effect; excluded instruments
in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8): Mafia 1900 and Mafia 1900*after1970; F-test of first stages always larger than 10.
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Figure 1: Percentage gap between DC and PCI.
48
Figure 2: Public investment in real terms in Italy (1948=1) (Picci, 2005).
49
Figure 3: Average DC vote share between 1946 and 1992 in Sicily.
50
Figure 4: Mafia distribution in Sicily (Carabinieri 1987).
51
Figure 5: The change in DC vote shares before and after 1970.52
